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CONFLICT OF LAWS:
INCHING FORWARD SLOWLY
Richard J. Conviser*
The author highlights the continuing uncertainty remaining in choice of
law determinations in the Illinois courts. Instead of clarifying matters in
the wake of the Ingersoll decision, the author argues that the courts have
not yet definitely accepted or rejected the Second Restatement's "most sig-
nificant relationship" approach for the non-tort substantive areas of law,
thereby leaving the practitioner in somewhat of a quandary.
NE year ago, it could be said with certainty that very little in the
conflict of laws area in Illinois could be viewed by practitioners
with certainty.' To be sure, in 1970 the Illinois Supreme Court
had, in Ingersoll v. Klein,2 decided that cases involving multi-
state tort issues were to be governed by the Second Restatement
"most significant relationship" approach. The Ingersoll decision fol-
lowed four years of utter confusion during which the Illinois courts
had pursued an ever wavering course between the Restatement
(First) "vested fights" and Restatement (Second) "most significant
relationship" approaches.
Dicta in Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, indicated
a willingness on the part of the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt the
new Restatement approach.' Such dicta seemed in keeping with the
enlightened Supreme Court decision in Wartell v. Formusa,4
wherein the new Restatement rules governing inter-spousal tort im-
munity were opted for in lieu of the standard vested rights rule. But
a number of appellate decisions at all levels strictly adhered to the
traditional rule.5 Unfortunately, the clarification provided by In-
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent
College of Law; Visiting Lecturer, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See Conviser, Conflict of Laws, 1971-72 Survey of Illinois Law, 22 DEPAUL
L. REv. 16 (1972).
2. Ingersoll v Klein, 46 Il1. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
3. 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
4. 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d
799 (1968); Bridges v. Ford Motor Co., 104 Ill. App. 2d 26, 243 N.E.2d 559
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
gersoll was incomplete. It was unclear as to whether its holding
should be confined to tort cases or be broadly applied to all sub-
stantive law areas." The opinion, in support of its analysis, quoted
heavily from Babcock v. Jackson' and Griffith v. United Airlines.8
The quoted language in the authority cited therein leveled an attack
not only on the lex loci delicti in specific, but on the vested rights ap-
proach in general.
Resolution of this problem has for several years now been, with-
out doubt, the main task confronting the Illinois Courts. Although
the task still remains, one court in the last year has at least "inched"
forward in a direction of progress.
The "clarifying" decision, P.S. & E. Inc. v. Selastomer Detroit
Inc.9 was a federal court decision decided by the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 10 The essential facts were fairly simple:
plaintiff allegedly entered into an oral contract to act as the exclu-
sive sales agent for defendant. The place of contracting was argu-
ably in either Michigan or Illinois. Plaintiff's principle place of bus-
iness was in Illinois, defendant's in Michigan. Negotiations had
taken place in both states, and the correspondence relied on as evi-
dence of the contractual terms was mailed between both states."
(1968); Kabek v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 Il. App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596
(1969). See also Waxman, Conflict in Illinois Courts on Choice of Law Theory in
Torts-Is It Lex Loci Delictus or Substantive Interest?, 59 ILL. B.J. 212 (1970);
Note, Conflict of Laws, Illinois Tort Choice-of-Law Problems Moved Toward
Further Confusion, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 841 (1970).
6. Although the court's main focus was clearly the quest for a meaningful
resolution of conflicts tort issues, the opinion could, nonetheless, support a much
broader interpretation. It should, perhaps, be noted that subsequent tort decisions
have uniformily applied the Ingersoll reasoning in that setting. See Wilhoite v.
Fastenware, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Il. 1972); Blazer v. Barrett, 10 Ill. App. 3d 837,
295 N.E.2d 89 (1973); Johnson v. Ward, 6 I1l. App. 3d 1015, 286 N.E.2d 637
(1972).
7. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
8. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
9. 470 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Benett, Contracts-Sales, 1972-73
Survey of Illinois Law, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. -, - infra.
10. It has long been well settled that a federal district court in diversity ofjurisdiction cases must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), including that state's conflict of law rules.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See generally
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 66, 150-54 (Rev. ed. 1968). The Seventh
Circuit in Selastomer was bound by this rule as the lower court proceedings had
been based on diversity jurisdiction.
11. 470 F.2d at 127.
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Performance was to be rendered in several states. 12  Defendant al-
legedly terminated the contract without cause and invaded plaintiff's
exclusive market area. In issue was the law to govern the dispute
arising out of this contract.
Judge Sprecher, writing for the court, relied upon Oakes v. Chi-
cago Firebrick Co.'" for the relevant governing rule. 14  Under its
principles, the law of the place of performance governs the con-
struction and obligations of the contract when the place of making
and place of performance differ, if the agreement is to be wholly
performed in one jurisdiction. If more than one place of perfor-
mance is involved, the place of making of the contract governs its
construction and obligations.' 5
Having stated the rule, the court then discovered it to be un-
workable in this fact pattern. The law of the place of performance
would, of course, not govern as the contract was to be performed in
more than one state.' 6 The rule's "fall back" position, viz., the law
of the place of making should then govern, could not be resorted to
as it was unclear where the contract was made.' 7 In short, the court
found itself with a unique fact pattern for which there was no Illi-
nois precedent.' 8
Undaunted, the court found its solution by engaging in a pre-
sumption as to what an Illinois court would do if faced with this
problem-their conclusion: an Illinois court would look to "analo-
gous modem tort cases relying upon the 'most significant contacts'
12. Although performance of the contract was contemplated on a rational scale,
it was realistically limited to those states where plaintiff had "active" salesmen,
namely, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana and Michigan. 470 F.2d at
127. In any event, more than one state was involved.
13. 388 Ill. 474, 58 N.E.2d 460 (1945).
14. Candidly, there is still some legitimate dispute as to whether the Illinois
position can be so readily reduced into a clearly operative rule. At least one
commentator has recently stated his belief that a number of rules might be
applicable. Earle, Conflict of Laws and the Second Restatement-Illinois Accepts
the Tort Provisions: What About Contracts?, 61 ILL. B.J. 292, 296 (1973). See
also Larson, Choice of Law: Illinois Contract Cases, 31 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 291
(1953). This confusion notwithstanding, the Oakes rule probably is still the
favored one in Illinois. See Bernhard, A Rationalization of the Illinois Conflict of
Laws Rules Applicable to Contracts, 40 ILL. L. REv. 165, 183-84 (1945).
15. 470 F.2d at 127.
16. See note 2 and accompanying text, supra.
17. See note 3 and accompanying text, supra.
18. 470 F.2d at 127.
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rule."1 9  The court then went on to find that Illinois law should
control as that state had the most significant relationship to the par-
ties and transaction.
What does Selastomer do for the Illinois practitioner? It does
this: it offers some current, positively stated precedent on the pres-
ent state of conflicts law in the contracts area, The rule enunciated
in the Oakes case is again embraced as the law of the land. To
this extent it is a welcome clarification which provides a somewhat
firmer footing. That having been said, a caveat should be added,
for in the process of "clarifying," the decision raises the spector of
potential further uncertainty. It would be a practitioner of limited
vision who would casually overlook the potential consequences of
the court's ultimate reliance on the Second Restatement, irrespective
of any distinguishing aspects of the unusual factual setting.
The discussion above leaves unanswered the question as to which
approach would be preferable, the Oakes rule or that of the new Re-
statement. This clearly was not a question that could be tackled
head-on by the federal courts as they are, of course, bound by the
existing local law conflicts rules. °
Arguments in favor of sustaining the Oakes rule necessarily re-
volve around a projected intention of the parties as to their obliga-
tions under the contract. If it is to take place essentially in one juris-
diction then, so the reasoning goes, they can visualize and pre-
pare for the contingencies surrounding their ultimate obligations un-
der the contract and would do so according to that place. Con-
versely, the place which is casually or fortuitously selected, as is so
often the case, for the execution of the contract, in no way enters
into such thoughts of the parties. Furthermore, its proponents
would argue that such a rule would, as do all of the vested rights
rules, give the parties a certain measure of certainty in their dealings,
a necessary pre-requisite when one is dealing with a contract situa-
tion which is a planned transaction. This they argue, should dis-
tinguish it from tort cases which "just happen" and which might
require an entirely different kind of analysis.
Proponents of the "most significant relationship" approach ap-
pear, however, to have the best of the argument. Surely, it is a de-
sirable goal to give to the court sufficient flexibility so that it might
19. Id.
20. See note 10, supra.
[Vol. 23:89
CONFLICT OF LAWS
adapt itself to any given set of facts presented in the instant litiga-
tion before it. The Second Restatement "most significant relation-
ship" test would more readily appear to do this.
The test is two pronged: both the connecting facts in a given case
as well as certain specified policy-oriented principles are to be con-
sidered. 1 The Second Restatement aids in this task by assigning
a qualitative value to specific factual contacts in each substantive
area. In a contracts case, the factual contacts generally regarded
as the most important are: the place of negotiation; the place of con-
tracting; the place of performance; the place where the subject mat-
ter of the contract is located; and the domicile residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Finally,
the Restatement goes a step further in making qualitative fact assess-
ments in the contracts area; it lays down more detailed rules in the
form of presumptions of which locality will likely have the most
significant relationship to certain kinds of contracts, for example,
the law of the situs in land sale contracts.22
One should note further that one of the Restatement's enu-
merated policy statements could be utilized to meet the desires for cer-
tainty in a planned transaction. Section 6(2) does provide for the
protection of justified expectations. This principle could obviously
be wielded to bring about any such desired effect, without being
upgraded to such a degree of certainty so as to rob the court of the
ability to decide that some other factor is more important in the
given case and should be weighted more heavily.23
21. The basic controlling Restatement Section is § 188. The factual contacts
are spelled out here in subsection 2 and the policy principles of § 6(2) are in-
corporated by reference. These policy principles are applicable to all substantive
areas of law. They are: (1) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(2) the relevant policies of the forms, (3) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (4) the protection of justified expectations, (5) the basic policies underlying
that particular field of law, (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and (7) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
These principles seem to reflect a compromise reached during the drafting of the
Second Restatement calculated to satisfy at least some desires of the interest analysis
proponents. Candidly, however, one wonders whether such generally stated prin-
ciples would be of any practical value in the resolution of conflict cases. The
doubt is heightened by those decisions handed down to date which have utilized
the approach taken in the Second Restatement. These invariably rely almost in
their entirety on a factual contact analysis in reaching a decision.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 189-197 (1968).
23. The author, however, does not wish to imply that the best approach is neces-
1973]
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OTHER MATTERS OF NOTE: DOMICILE
In Davis v. Davis24 an Illinois appellate court was faced with a
domicile fact issue that would be any conflicts professor's dream
hypothetical.
In Davis, the plaintiff, Shelley Davis, was seeking an Illinois di-
vorce. Domicile came into issue when his defendant wife, Laura,
alleged that he had not been a resident of Illinois for one year prior
to institution of the divorce action, as required by statute.25 The
court, thus, found itself in a position of evaluating the facts in order
to determine whether sufficient contacts with Illinois existed so that
statutory requirements could be satisfied. The facts presented to
them were as follows:
Shelley Davis was born and raised in Chicago, where he lived
with his parents. In 1954, when he was in his last year of high
school, he attended an out-of-state boarding school. Thereafter, he
commenced on a career as a perennial academic. He was engaged
as a student and/or instructor in various universities, all outside the
state of Illinois, from 1954 until the commencement of the litigation.
At the time of litigation, he was pursuing a full time teaching career
at the University of Maryland.
Throughout this period of time his parents set aside one bedroom
in their apartment for Shelley's use. He kept some of his possessions
there. Indeed, when his parents had moved about four years prior
to this suit, he changed his voting address and draft board residence
sarily that formulated in the Second Restatement. It is to be hoped that Illinois
courts, in formulating their own "final" choice of law approaches will at least con-
sider other alternatives.
24. 9 111. App. 3d 922, 293 N.E.2d 399 (1973).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 3 (1971). This Illinois statutory provision, as is
true with so very many statutory provisions predicated upon domicile, contains the
term "residence." The question then arises as to whether the statutory term is
synonymous with domicile as the term is usually interpreted or is intended to convey
a different meaning. Although there is a spectrum of possible meaning, domicile as
it is generally utilized in divorce statutes, including Illinois, refers to a technical
domicile plus actual residence. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 17 (1971). Given this interpretation, the courts are in a position
to more readily find that domicile exists in a given instance than would be the
case if they were dealing with traditional domicile concepts. Obviously, however,
this would depend upon the statutory construction to be given to any given individual
statute. See also Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence", 6 VAND. L. REV.
561 (1953).
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address to the new location.2" Shelley opened and maintained a
savings account at a Chicago bank since 1960. He had also filed
his federal income tax returns in Chicago and had continued to
receive some correspondence at his Chicago address.
The most obvious out-of-state factual contacts, of course, re-
volved around the simple fact that for almost twenty years Shelley
had, in fact, lived outside of Illinois. The marriage, the dissolu-
tion of which was in issue, had been celebrated in New York and
the couple had lived in New York. At the time of the law suit,
Shelley was living in Maryland where he held his full time teaching
job and his wife and child were living in West Virginia.
Shelley maintained a bank account in Maryland. He had ac-
quired a Maryland driver's license and purchased a car which was
registered in Maryland. He had filed both New York and Maryland
income tax returns.2 7 He had also applied for a country club mem-
bership in West Virginia on behalf of his wife.
The trial court found that Shelley's factual contacts with the
state of Illinois were sufficient to fall within the statutory require-
ments and granted the requested divorce. On appeal, the appellate
court affirmed. It noted that although there was "considerable evi-
dence of Shelley's ties with other states over his life time . . . there
[was] also sufficient evidence of his intent to remain an Illinois citizen
to support the finding of continued Illinois residence."28  It further
stated that temporary absence, even though admittedly lengthy in the
instant case, was not sufficient to equate with abandonment.29 The
court went on further to express what probably is the rule to be de-
rived from this case, mainly, that questions as to intent to abandon
a residence specifically (and probably domicile fact questions gen-
erally) are for the trier of fact to answer and once having been an-
swered not to be overruled unless against the manifest weight of the
26. In February, 1971, after the suit was filed, a voters canvas resulted in his
name being stricken from the voting list. He, however, had been reinstated as a
registered voter prior to trial.
27. There was some conflict in the testimony of the plaintiff as to whether he
had ever filed an Illinois State Income Tax return. 9 111. App. 3d at 926, 293 N.E.
2d at 402.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 926, 293 N.E.2d at 403. The court here relied on Cohn v. Cohn, 327
l. App. 22, 63 N.E.2d 618 (1945).
1973]
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There are two quarrels with the Davis court's reasoning. The
first is rather technical. The court stated that what would be neces-
sary to prove that one has given up a domicile is to show affirma-
tive acts of abandonment. This is incomplete statement. It has long
been well settled that it is not only necessary to prove that a domicile
has been abandoned, but it is also necessary to prove that a new
domicile has been acquired. In short, both steps are required to
effect a change of domicile. Until the second step is completed, how-
ever, one will retain one's former domicile even though the record
shows a clear intent to abandon.3 1  The result could have been,
obviously, the same had the court followed this approach as well.
This is so because the rule generally followed would also require
that the party asserting that a change of domicile has taken place
would also have to bear the burden of proof A
The second quarrel with the Davis decision is somewhat more
serious. In reaching domicile fact determinations a court should
always bear in mind that domicile issues are never "resolved in a
vacuum." Put another way, one is always making a domicile fact
determination because something else depends on it. In this case,
the matter that depends upon a finding of domicile is that of
whether subject matter jurisdiction is present for purposes of granting a
divorce. As such, the court should have taken into account the interest
that Illinois might have in granting a divorce for this particular mar-
riage. Shelley and Laura Davis had met and married in New York.
They had lived marital existence together in New York and in other
states, not however, in Illinois. Throughout the course of litigation,
neither party was physically living in Illinois, nor was it likely that they
would. Given this fact situation one can only pose the question as
30. id.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 19 (1969). The classic
case on this point is In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921). In
that case, Evan Jones, a domiciliary of Iowa, decided to return to his native Wales
to live out the rest of his days. He sold his property in Iowa and left for England.
Unfortunately, the ship on which he was sailing, the ill-fated Lusitania, was sunk by a
German submarine-and he never made it. Even though he had very clearly mani-
fested his intent to abandon his Iowa domicile, the court found that he would retain it
until he had acquired a new one elsewhere, i.e., Wales. Since he had never arrived
in Wales, he, of course, never satisfied that second requirement, and thus, retained
his Iowa domicile.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19, comment C (1969).
[Vol. 23:89
1973] CONFLICT OF LAWS 97
to what interest Illinois had in dissolving this marriage. The answer
is probably none and at best a very slight one. That being the case,
a contrary result would probably have been the better one.
The result suggested immediately is of course, academic. The
court found domicile to exist, and did so in a fashion that leads one
to offer this bit of advice to Illinois practitioners: Domicile issues in
Illinois courts will be liberally resolved in favor of a finding that domi-
cile exists on the facts and, whatever the result, the ultimate one will
invariably be that reached by the trial court for a reversal on appeal
is highly unlikely.
